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Red Cloud at Dawn

Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly

Picador, November 2010
ISBN: 978-0-312-65542-6, ISBN10: 0-312-65542-8,
5 1/2 x 8 1/4 inches, 416 pages, Includes 7 maps,
Trade Paperback, $18.00

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Categories and Subcategories

See All Categories History United States: 1945 to Present World: Europe Russian & Eastern European Studies Russian & Eastern European Studies - All Titles Science Chemistry & Physics

On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet test bomb, dubbed "First Lightning," exploded in the deserts of Kazakhstan. The startling event was not simply a technical experiment that confirmed the ability of the Soviet Union to build nuclear bombs during a period when the United States held a steadfast monopoly; it was also an international event that marked the beginning of an arms race that would ultimately lead to nuclear proliferation beyond the two superpowers.

Following a trail of espionage, secrecy, deception, political brinksmanship, and technical innovation, Michael D. Gordin challenges conventional technology-centered nuclear histories by looking at the prominent roles that atomic intelligence and other forms of information play in the uncertainties of nuclear arms development and political decision-making. With the use of newly opened archives, Red Cloud at Dawn focuses on the extraordinary story of "First Lightning" to provide a fresh understanding of the origins of the nuclear arms race, as well as the all-too-urgent problem of proliferation.

Praise

“Gordin’s Red Cloud at Dawn is about the brief period between August 1945 and August 1949, between Hiroshima and Kazakhstan, when the United States held a nuclear monopoly. It’s about how the Soviets caught up and how America learned that that happy hour was ending a lot sooner than expected. This is a book full of great details, like the importance of German uranium to the Soviet bomb effort, and the early technologies explored by the Americans as they sought a way to detect an eventual Soviet detonation. (Would a nuclear explosion leave an effect on the exact opposite point on the globe?) But, inevitably, it’s also a book about a big question. Those years are some of the most complicated in American history. Great successes, like the Marshall Plan, combined with one monumental failure: the beginning of a catastrophically unwise arms race. Somehow, rational decision was piled upon rational decision to create something utterly irrational. Four decades later, two countries with few disputes over land had lavished trillions of dollars and rubles on world-destroying weapons. And one of the great debates for historians—as well as for those concerned with American national security—is whether anything could have been done between 1945 and 1949 to avoid all that. Gordin’s answer in this fine, thoroughly researched book is yes, and his main argument is that the United States should have been more open about sharing atomic information. If not so fixated on espionage and secrecy, maybe the two antagonists could have figured out a way to forestall the arms race.”—Nicholas Thompson, The New York Times Book Review

"Gordin brings considerable scholarship the the subject of how the Soviets succeeded in building an atomic bomb . . . .Weaves an impressively wide range of sources into a brilliant narrative about the intelligence war."—History Today

“Nothing about the early cold war can be understood without grasping the terrifying first few years of nuclear weapons. Everything was in play: who would have them, who would control them, would they be used to enforce a pax Americana. Spies, diplomats, treaties, and detonations—nothing gripped decision makers as much as the atomic arsenal, from screaming headlines to the silent intelligence analyses on both sides of the divide. In Red Cloud at Dawn, Michael Gordin zeros in on the crucial years from Hiroshima to the first flash of ‘Joe 1’ in 1949, the first Russian bomb and the ninth nuclear explosion. Using a spectacular variety of sources from Soviet and American sources, Gordin gives us a book that must be read to understand how we came to the sprawling nuclear proliferation in which we now live.”—Peter Galison, Joseph Pellegrino University Professor, Harvard University

“Beginning with Truman’s revelation to Stalin that the United States had an unusually powerful weapon, Michael Gordin tells the story of the Soviet A-bomb and the origins of the Cold War arms race. The ‘dialectical dance’ of the superpowers entailed a deadly embrace that cost millions but miraculously avoided nuclear holocaust. This is a story of intelligence in both senses of the word—of spies and scientists, of information rather than simply fissionable material and devices. The red mushroom cloud rose on August 29, 1949, and, as Gordin’s compelling narrative shows, the fallout, in its many senses, remains with us today.”—Ronald Suny, Charles Tilly Collegiate Professor of Social and Political History, University of Michigan

“Michael Gordin brings vividly to life the end of the American atomic monopoly. By focusing on what each side knew—and did not know—about the other, he sheds new and original light on the origins of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. This is a stylish book, with important implications for how we think about nuclear weapons past and present.”—David Holloway, author of Stalin and the Bomb

"The dramatic but familiar story of how American leaders used nuclear weaponry to end World War II marks but the beginning of the little-understood period during which American leaders jealously protected their hard-won monopoly in atomic firepower while fearfully anticipating Soviet breakthroughs that would loose the dynamics of global proliferation. In his taut narrative, Gordin retraces the complex events leading up to First Lightning, the Soviets' epoch-making atomic test in August 1949—far sooner than most American experts expected. More than a tale of scientific ingenuity, this chronicle probes the human motives of those involved in a high-stakes drama. Truman and Stalin naturally command center stage, but readers also scrutinize the mercurial Oppenheimer and the irreproachable Kurchatov—and numerous other key actors. Readers will recognize parallels between the Soviet bomb effort and America's earlier Manhattan Project, but Gordin stresses the marked differences—in organization, resources, personnel, and security precautions. Readers may already know how spies—Fuchs, Hall, Hiss—passed along secrets to Soviet authorities; however, they may not realize why the Soviets relied on human espionage while their American counterparts deployed innovative technology to gather their intelligence data. A perceptive study, rich with implications for a twenty-first-century world still fraught with nuclear tensions."—Bryce Christensen, Booklist (starred review)

“Gordin has crafted a quite wonderful book . . . [It] greatly expands what we should know about the contest for nuclear supremacy in the early Cold War. Heartily recommended.”—Ed Goedeken, Library Journal

About the Author(s)

Michael D. Gordin

Michael D. Gordin is an associate professor of the history of science at Princeton University. He is the author of Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War.