The Language Wars

1 'To boldly go'

Truths and myths about English

It seems as if no day passes without an argument over the English language and its 'proper' use. We debate the true meanings of words, the nuances of grammar, the acceptability of slang, attitudes to regional accents, resistance to newfangled terms, confusion about apostrophes, the demise of the semicolon.

Why do questions of grammar, spelling and punctuation trouble us? Why are we intrigued or unsettled by other people's pronunciation and vocabulary? Why does the magazine The Awl report 'the awful rise of "snuck"', and is the word ilk really, as The Economist counsels, 'best avoided'?1 Do we laugh or grimace when we see outside the entrance to a friend's apartment block a sign reading: 'Please Ring the Buzzard'? What about if the sign says 'Please, Ring the Buzzard!'? Why do we object to someone sighing 'I could care less' rather than asserting 'I could not care less'? What is it that irks people about alleged being vocalized as three syllables rather than two?

The ways in which we and others use language have implications for our relationships, our work and our freedoms. Much of the time we select our words deliberately, and we choose to whom we speak and where we write. We may therefore feel uncomfortable about others' less careful use of language.
Perhaps you are feeling uncomfortable right now. You are likely to have spotted those queasy inverted commas around 'proper' in my opening paragraph. Maybe you disapproved of them. I might have deployed them in several other places, save for the suspicion that you would have found them irritating. But immediately we are in the thick of it, in the mêlée of the language wars. For notions such as 'proper', 'true meaning' and 'regional' are all contentious.

To sharpen our sense of this contest, I'll introduce a quotation from a novel. One character says, 'I cannot speak well enough to be unintelligible.' 'Bravo!' comes the response. 'An excellent satire on modern language.' When was this novel written? Recently? Twenty years ago, or sixty? Actually, it is Northanger Abbey, written by Jane Austen in the late 1790s.

I cannot speak well enough to be unintelligible. The words, said by Austen's teenage heroine Catherine Morland, are not meant to be satirical. They give pleasure now because they present, in miniature, some of the more vexed issues of English usage. Catherine is struck by the indirectness of polite conversation, and sees her own clarity as a mark of being unsophisticated. That strikes a chord: we all have experience of speech and text in which unintelligibility is displayed as though a badge of educational or social refinement. The American academic Alan Sokal has parodied this deliciously, publishing in a scholarly journal a spoof article entitled 'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity', which uses smart words to dress up claims about the nonexistence of laws of physics and the need for a 'multiculturalist' understanding of mathematics.2
There are other concerns humming in the background of the extract from Jane Austen. Who decides whether someone speaks well? As for 'well enough' - is the insufficiency of Catherine's speech something perceived by her or by others, and, if the latter, how have they let her know about it? Are there, in fact, any virtues in unintelligibility, or in not being immediately intelligible? To put it another way, are there times when we benefit from expressing ourselves in a warped or aberrant fashion, our individualism saturating our idiom? And what does Henry Tilney, the rather flirtatious clergyman who is the object of Catherine's affections, mean by 'modern language'? Austen's writing invites this kind of close attention. Ironies are everywhere, and her characters are forever picking their way through the linguistic hazards of polite society.

Next, here is the title of an essay: 'The Growing Illiteracy of American Boys'. When do you suppose it was published? 2010? 1980? In fact this piece was the work of E. L. Godkin, founder of the magazine The Nation, and was published in 1896. Godkin lamented the absence of practical language skills among college students. He based his arguments not on research in some unlettered backwoods, but on an extended study of written work done at Harvard. In America in the late nineteenth century, universities were criticized for failing to prepare students for professional life. In 1891, the future President Herbert Hoover was required to take a remedial English course before being admitted to Stanford, and that same year James Morgan Hart, a professor at Cornell, could write that 'the cry all over the country is: Give us more English! Do not let our young men and women grow up in ignorance of their mother tongue!'3

Now, moving back in time to 1712, this is Sir Richard Steele, a usually convivial observer of London life, writing in The Spectator - a periodical which influenced eighteenth-century ideas of polite usage, though in its original form it ran for only twenty-one months and sold about 3,000 copies per issue: 'The scandalous abuse of Language and hardening of Conscience, which may be observed every Day in going from one Place to another, is what makes a whole City to an unprejudiced Eye a Den of Thieves.' Here is the same author, the previous year: 'The Dialect of Conversation is now-a-days so swelled with Vanity and Compliment ... that if a Man that lived an Age or two ago should return into the World again he would really want a Dictionary to help him to understand his own Language.' Finally, here he is in 1713 in a newspaper called The Guardian (no relation of the more famous paper founded by Manchester businessmen in 1821): 'As the World now goes, we have no adequate Idea of what is meant by Gentlemanly ... Here is a very pleasant Fellow, a Correspondent of mine, that puts in for that Appellation even to High-way Men.'

Reflecting on Steele's complaints, we may well say to ourselves that little has changed in the last three hundred years. But the history of talking about language's imperfections goes back even further than this. It is not exclusive to English. In the first century BC the critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus celebrated recent improvements in oratory by rubbishing the rhetoric of the previous generation; this, he said, was 'intolerable in its melodramatic shamelessness' and possessed of a crudeness that made Greece 'like the household of some desperate roué, where the decent, respectable wife sits powerless in her own home, while some nitwit of a girl ... treats her like dirt.'4 This is the way critics of language use are apt to express themselves; we can quickly lose sight of the fact that they are discussing language, because they deploy such extravagant images.

In the late nineteenth century the American linguist William Dwight Whitney argued that language is an institution. It is 'the work of those whose wants it subserves; it is in their sole keeping and control; it has been by them adapted to their circumstances and wants, and is still everywhere undergoing at their hands such adaptation'. Its elements are 'the product of a series of changes, effected by the will and consent of men, working themselves out under historical conditions, and conditions of man's nature, and by the impulse of motives, which are, in the main, distinctly traceable'.5 Whitney's model has flaws, but he alights on an important idea: 'Every existing form of human speech is a body of arbitrary and conventional signs ... handed down by tradition.' Crucially, therefore, change is 'the fundamental fact upon which rests the whole method of linguistic study'.6 Common assent and custom are, he argues, fundamental to meaning, and at any moment we may experience a kind of amnesia about what the words we employ used to mean and where they came from.

Although many will agree with Whitney's view of language as a set of habits, other conceptions of language persist. English-speakers are touchy about questions of usage. This sort of touchiness is not uncommon among speakers of other languages, but English is the most contested major language. By this I mean that its small details and large presence are fought over more vociferously than those of any other language.

The fight is most often about 'the fundamental fact' of language identified by Whitney. Change happens. All living human languages alter: meanings shift, and so do pronunciations and grammatical structures. We may feel that the language we use is stable, but this is an illusion. For all that it may unnerve us, there is nothing weird or wrong about change; it would be much weirder if change did not happen. Language is form, not substance; not communication, but a system of communication - a point on which I shall expand.

We are the agents of change. The 'facts' of language are social: changes occur in a language because there are changes in the conditions under which the language is used. Needs alter, values shift, and opportunities vary. For many, the experience of being caught up in language change is maddening. It requires a large effort of detachment to think that the rise of textspeak may be one of the glories of minimalism. But feeling outrage is not the same as being right.

The idea that we are doomed to disagree about language is, of course, the subject of one of the most memorable stories - and one of the most enduring images - in the Old Testament. This is in chapter 11 of the Book of Genesis. In the King James Version, the text reads as follows:

And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech. And it came to pass, as they [the families of the sons of Noah] journeyed from the east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there ... And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.

This has become a defining myth in Western culture. Notionally we are the descendants of the families of the sons of Noah, and we suffer the effects of our forefathers' arrogance. Our punishment is incomprehension of other people; their minds are shuttered from our gaze. The myth of Babel fosters the idea that we are doomed to be separated by language not only from other societies, but also from people within our own society.

Samuel Johnson, the eighteenth-century polymath who was the author of the first really good English dictionary, claimed that 'Tongues, like governments, have a natural tendency to degeneration.' It is true that languages in the past have tended to divide and proliferate. Yet rather than thinking of this as degeneration, we can see the diversity of languages in a different way: as permitting through its richness greater possibilities for creativity and adaptability, and as generating opportunities for collaboration and reciprocity that are powerful precisely because they are difficult. The world is a boisterous parliament of tongues. And not only between different languages, but also within each language, there is this disparity, this scattering, this dissociation - which can be seen as a problem, as a mere fact, or as the very wellspring of the efforts we pour into communicating.

A language is a transcript of history, not an immutable edifice. Whoever makes this point, though, is at risk of being labelled permissive. In fact, a derogatory adverb usually accompanies 'permissive': 'hopelessly' or 'dangerously' or 'recklessly' - as if one has been encouraging anonymous sex or the sharing of hypodermic needles. There is a gulf of difference between, on the one hand, questioning bogus rules and, on the other, urging people to use language insensibly and promiscuously. But to many self-appointed guardians of good usage (and almost all such guardians are self-appointed) the gulf is invisible. These guardians come in many guises. They may be teachers, retired civil servants, senior broadcasters, seasoned editors, people who like writing letters to newspapers, word-fanciers, or the semi-educated. Some make sensible observations, but many are hypocrites. Their rage can be tempestuous. Just ask the language professors who have received hate mail for refusing to take a stand against split infinitives.

In the chapters that follow, I shall explore the history of arguments about English. The movement of the book will be, in broad terms, chronological. Yet digging into the past will often prompt thoughts about the language as it is today. Rather than unfurling a narrative of what-happened-next, I shall move between the past and the present. The connections between them are essential to my story.
The geographical focus will at first be Britain; then I shall range more widely, reflecting the emergence of English as an international language. Some chapters will dwell on a concept, for certain subjects require a single sustained treatment. I shall also zero in on people who have exerted an especially strong influence on ideas about English; one of my themes is the role of individuals in shaping the language and our beliefs about it. Ralph Waldo Emerson has a lovely line that 'Language is a city to the building of which every human has brought a stone'.This captures the sense - vital here - of language as a consensual, communal but also ongoing construction. My account of the building of this city will be investigative. But, as I proceed, a polemical strand will become apparent.

I sometimes give talks about English, and I am always keen to take questions afterwards. My first book was about Samuel Johnson's dictionary. My second was a history of words absorbed into English from other languages. Whenever I speak about these books and the time for questions comes, the past has to make way for concerns about the present: my feelings about apostrophes or the perceived evils of instant messaging. We are dogged by the notion that the English language is in a state of terrible decline. Here, writing in the 1980s, is the distinguished American educator Jacques Barzun: 'Two of the causes in the decline of all modern European languages have been: the doctrines of linguistic science and the example of "experimental" art,' and 'The language we have now has suffered damage wholesale, the faults encountered come not as single spies but in battalions.'7 I hear this kind of thing a lot: individual words are being cheapened, diction is on the slide, grammar is getting bastardized, and 'In fifty years English literature will mean nothing to us.' Once, after an event in Edinburgh, an audience member bearded me to ask, 'Don't you think this is a very uniquely sad moment in the history of our language?'
In truth, I don't. I could pedantically reply that there are no degrees of uniqueness. More to the point, though, the present moment does not strike me as sad. It is normal to imagine one is living in an age of exceptional violence and anarchy, yet this is to be blind to the problems of every other age. Our sense of the particular seriousness of the difficulties we face is sharpened by narcissism, and more than that by the belief that we can improve matters. We take a morbid pleasure in believing that the special randomness of our world requires of us a special heroism. Yet novelty is not the same thing as decline. English is no more going to the dogs than it was in the middle of the nineteenth century when pessimists predicted that within a hundred years the speech of Britons and of Americans would be mutually unintelligible, or in the 1550s when the humanist scholar Thomas Wilson complained in The Arte of Rhetorique, a book 'for the use of all suche as are studious of eloquence sette forth in Englische', that well-travelled gentlemen had lately started to 'powder' their conversation with confusing 'oversea language'.

To say this, I recognize, is to provoke. Experience suggests that you can always start a row by staking a claim about English usage. Get mixed up in the question of plurals, for instance. Insist that, since the word data is plural in Latin, if we have been given only one piece of information it is a 'datum'. Allege that when confronted with more than one hippopotamus, one should speak not of hippopotamuses, but of 'hippoipotamou'. Say that a Birmingham accent - be it Birmingham, England, or Birmingham, Alabama, or one of the two Birminghams in Ohio - is inferior to a middle-class London one. Claim for that matter that some languages are spoken much faster than others or that Americans are ruining English. Protest, as someone did to me at a festival, that 'However stupid English grammar is, at least English has got grammar - unlike Chinese.' Assert that 'The crowd is on its feet' is better than the 'The crowd are on their feet', or insist that you cannot say 'The class of '89 is having a reunion, and there's a big surprise in store for them'.

When we argue about language, we are often concerned with the ways in which it impairs thought. Words seem to lack the precision of numbers or symbols, and the elasticity of language propels misunderstandings. This argument is not new. Those who have studied language most deeply have done so in the hope that it will enable them to understand thought and indeed life itself. Meanwhile, philosophy is forever encroaching on linguistic concerns.

These are sensitive areas, and there is a distinguished tradition of thinkers who have created philosophical mayhem by kicking against conventional and unreflective images of what language is and how it works. We can trace this tradition back as far as Plato's Cratylus in the fourth century BC, which examines some of the basic problems in the study of language (such as the conventions of how we name things), and the more sustained efforts of Plato's pupil Aristotle, who was especially concerned with establishing the vocabulary we use to describe and categorize reality. Their successors have included St Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century, who speculated about the process by which language skills are acquired; John Locke in the seventeenth, who argued that words are arbitrary signs denoting our ideas; Wilhelm von Humboldt, a Prussian diplomat and educational theorist, who insisted on treating language as a phenomenon situated in reality rather than as something abstract (a 'dead contraption'), and thought of it as a creative activity, making infinite uses of a finite number of elements; Jacob Grimm, famous with his brother Wilhelm for collecting folk tales, and responsible also for making historical research the cornerstone of linguistics; and Ferdinand de Saussure, who changed this, emphasizing the idea of language as a system of relationships, and positing the need to study a language system not through its historical development (a diachronic approach), but at a particular moment in time (a synchronic one).

Modern linguistics owes something to all these figures, but is especially indebted to Saussure. Its message is that the present is the key to the past. By this I mean that the forces that created languages are at work right now. Looking at languages as they exist today enables us to understand their history. What this also suggests is that things we may consider problems in the present are in fact evidence of the powerful creative forces of language.

Many of the large challenges that face us may be new, but the issues at stake are familiar, and the little details that niggle us have niggled previous generations just as much, if not more. We hear worriers disparaging imported words (does nouvelle vague accomplish more than new wave?), slang (today's term of approval, let's say hot, may tomorrow seem stale), abbreviations (sometimes with justice - it amazes me that 'Accid anal prev' is used instead of 'Accident analysis and prevention'), ambiguous syntax ('Once she'd been neutered, the princess went to collect her cat') and the lapses of public figures who 'ought to know better' (George W. Bush saying 'Rarely is the question asked: "Is our children learning?"'). As a result we may imagine that we are living in an age of egregious stupidity and crassness - and of remarkable linguistic precariousness. But this suspicion was just as common in the England of Chaucer, Shakespeare or Milton, in the Britain of Dickens, and in the America of the Pilgrim Fathers, George Washington or Martin Luther King.

Furthermore, some things we now consider to be mistakes or solecisms were once quite acceptable. Do we pretend not to understand Edgar in King Lear when he vows 'to take the basest and most poorest shape'? Are we racked with indignation when we hear Bassanio in The Merchant of Venice read a letter from Antonio containing the words 'All debts are cleared between you and I'? The stout defenders of the Queen's English - a construct first mentioned in 1592 by the Elizabethan pamphleteer Thomas Nashe - or indeed of the King's English - mentioned in 1553 by Thomas Wilson - pretend that they exert themselves in order to ensure that the language remains a channel for clear communication. But the sorts of usage that offend them hardly prevent communication. When Mick Jagger sings 'I can't get no satisfaction', none of us can in good faith claim that his double negative has led us to believe he feels blissfully satisfied. When Chaucer writes of the Knight in The Canterbury Tales 'He nevere yet no vileynye ne sayde', we may be thrown by 'vileynye' (it means the Knight never said anything defamatory or discreditable), but the accumulation of negatives does not prevent us from sniffing the courtly aroma of the Knight's politeness.

One obvious difference here is that Mick Jagger is speaking (after a fashion), whereas Chaucer is writing. Different standards should be applied to the spoken and written forms of the language. Yet often people discussing the use of English fail to recognize the distinction. I shall be saying plenty more about this. Or rather, writing plenty more.

With reference to both speech and writing, most of us practise linguistic hygiene, brushing or swabbing away what we see as pollutants - jargon, vulgarisms, profanity, bad grammar and mispronunciations - and sometimes in the process replacing one kind of evil with another. Alarmists are apt to vilify the types of people they think most culpable: they have in the past condemned travellers, shopkeepers, journalists, university students, nurses, hairdressers, people who live in cities, homosexuals, the authors of translations, and women.8 All of us, besides using language, comment on it, and we complain about others' usage far more often than we applaud it. Where language is concerned, some are engineers, but more of us are doctors.

This kind of appraisal can be entertaining, but its main appeal is that it allows us to tidy up reality. At the same time it reveals our aversion to disorder. We fear not being able to make ourselves understood, and fear also that the essentials of our world-view are not shared by others. When we practise what the linguist Deborah Cameron has designated 'verbal hygiene', we expose our anxieties about otherness and difference.9 It can seem as though we positively want to feel that our language is coming unstuck. Even if other aspects of our existence appear beyond our control, language feels as if it can be rescued from the chaos of modernity. If we can arrest language change, the thinking goes, we can hold off other kinds of change.10 All the while, people who stress that change is inevitable are dismissed as wimpish egalitarians, pluralists, relativists - as 'Shit happens' defeatists. Yet if the 'Anything goes' approach seems an abdication of responsibility, its opposite, pernickety micromanagement, recalls in its desperateness King Canute's mythic efforts to turn back the waves.

It is time to look at a rule, to see pernicketiness in action. I want to consider something seemingly humdrum, which is nonetheless one of the most enduringly contentious subjects in English grammar. My chosen issue is the split infinitive, perennial bugbear of neo-Victorians and TV's (fictional) Dr Frasier Crane. The opening credits of Star Trek contain the best-known of all split infinitives. The mission of the Starship Enterprise is, we are informed, 'to explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no man has gone before.' It's a line much satirized, as by Douglas Adams in The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, where the heroes of the wild and long-lost Galactic Empire are said to have dared 'to boldly split infinitives that no man had split before'. But is this phrasing so dreadful? Leaving aside for a moment the question of what rule there is about the treatment of infinitives (and also the decision to say 'no man' rather than 'no one'), we might usefully focus on the rhetorical force of the statement as it is at present couched. The rhythm here is important.The three-part structure 'to explore ... to seek ... to go' is disrupted by the abrupt introduction of 'boldly'. Rather than being a bad thing, this accentuates our impression of the narrator's excitement about the sheer boldness of the quest. The assonance of 'to boldly go' is more striking - not only because of its rhythm, but also because less compressed - than that of 'to go boldly'. 'Boldly to go' would just seem precious.
The split infinitive is found at least as early as the thirteenth century. It occurs a couple of times in Chaucer, rather more often in the writings of John Wyclif, and a huge amount in the fifteenth-century works of Reginald Pecock, a Welsh bishop who delighted in the form. It seems to have been considered inelegant for most of the two centuries that followed - Shakespeare has only one, in a sonnet ('Thy pity may deserve to pitied be') - and was uncommon until the later stages of the eighteenth century, when it began to appear in the writings of even the most punctilious authors, such as Samuel Johnson. Hostility to the practice of splitting infinitives developed in the nineteenth century. A magazine article dating from 1834 may well be the first published condemnation of it. A large number of similar prohibitions followed. The first to call it a 'split infinitive' was a contributor to the magazine Academy in 1897.11

The prohibition originates in a regard for Latin, and for some people today is reinforced by the split infinitive's impossibility in German. The experimental psychologist Steven Pinker has suggested that 'forcing modern speakers of English ... not to split an infinitive because it isn't done in Latin makes about as much sense as forcing modern residents of England to wear laurels and togas'.12 But let's just probe the rule for a moment. In Latin, the infinitive is expressed by a single word: amare means 'to love', venire means 'to come'. It is, in short, unsplittable. Now consider Latin's treatment of nouns: in Latin there is no definite or indefinite article - 'a girl' is puella, 'the threads' is fimbriae. No one would suggest that we cannot say 'a clever girl' or 'the broken threads'. Yet isn't this a split nominative? Is it not as much of a crime as a split infinitive?

'I am going to really do it' means something different from 'I am really going to do it' and 'Really I am going to do it' and 'I am going to do it really'. The location in this sentence of the adverb really is not - should not - be a matter merely of propriety or euphony. It should be determined by which version best conveys one's intended meaning.

This principle can be illustrated by the case of another common adverb, only. It pays to keep only as close as possible to the word it modifies. Consider, for instance, the disparity between 'I only take off my socks when she asks' and 'I take off my socks only when she asks'. For good measure, let's add 'I take off only my socks when she asks'. Three rather different pictures of domestic life emerge here. A fourth develops if I change the sentence again: 'Only I take off my socks when she asks.' Obviously there is no infinitive to split in these examples, but they suggest the importance of where we place an adverb. Sometimes we have to split infinitives, not only because anything else sounds weird, but because the prissy avoidance of a split infinitive results in a distortion of our meaning. It's hard to see how I could neatly and economically reformulate the sentence 'I expect our output to more than double next year'. The proper thing to do is whatever seems most natural, least fidgety. But what kind of a guideline is that?

Most people cleave to certain rules about English. They behave as though these are eternal, immutable edicts - the violation of which is a symptom of low intelligence and poor breeding. I can remember being chastised at school by a teacher who insisted that a civilized person could never put a comma before and or use the words lot and got. Most of us have been encouraged to believe that rules of this kind are important. And there are a large number of them. The index to A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (1985), a 1,779-page tome by the eminent scholars Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik, identifies 3,500 distinct points of grammar. There are many indistinct ones besides.

I am not going to claim to be immune from the 'rules'. I find myself wincing when someone says 'between you and I'. I'll admit, too, that when I hear this I suspect that the person who has said it is trying to sound smart and educated. But, even as I wince, my inner linguist recognizes that the response is aesthetic and is one which I have been conditioned to express. For these rules - note my earlier inverted commas - are not really rules, but conventions. At different times, and in different places, different conventions are the norm. Of course, some of these conventions become so deeply ingrained in us that we find it hard to grant they are merely that; we think of them as timeless, profound and inherently sensible. Conventions can put down deep roots; they can be hard to eradicate. Yet they have changed before and will change again.

Conventions are contingent. Communication may depend on our observing them, but, examined dispassionately, many seem odd. (To get away from language for a moment, consider the conventions of chess, video games, formal dress or opera.) If I stop to think about why it's correct to say X but not to say Y, I may not be able to come up with much of an explanation. We generally adhere to the conventions because it is practical to do so. A convention is a solution to a recurrent problem of coordination; by sticking to it, one not only overcomes the problem, but makes it invisible. If you are playing football and you decide to pick the ball up and run with it, you are likely to be sent from the pitch; few people are going to think you have done something clever, witty or original, and most will find your behaviour difficult to understand, because you have violated the rules of the game. Where language is concerned, we play by what we understand to be the rules because we sense - on the whole unconsciously - a responsibility to the people with whom we are communicating.

This book is written in what I hope is a crisp kind of standard English (of which more anon), because that is what I have been taught, that is what I have tended to absorb as a reader, and that is what I imagine the audience for this book is likely to favour. Writing more colloquially would feel wrong. Yet as soon as one begins to analyse the idea of what is correct and what incorrect, one sees how entangled it is with notions of what's appropriate, felicitous, effective, useful and socially acceptable.
Copyright © 2011 by Henry Hitchings